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Pure imagery hemi-neglect of far space
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A. Pegna, PhD; E. Mayer, PhD; L. Spinelli, PhD; and T. Landis, MD
Abstract—Patients with hemispatial neglect restricted to near (within reaching distance) or to far space (beyond reaching
distance) have been described. This constitutes a double-dissociation considered by current neurocognitive thinking as
compelling evidence for separate networks. However, a similar double-dissociation exists with respect to perceived as
opposed to imagined space. If the organization of represented space was similar to that of perceived space, it should
contain a far/near dissociation as well. This paper describes a patient with pure representational neglect restricted to far
space.
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Differences in patients’ handling of space within1 or
beyond2 reaching distance have puzzled clinicians for
more than half a century.1-5 Recent descriptions of
patients with hemispatial neglect restricted to near1
or far perceptual space2 supported the assumption of
specific neural networks dedicated to treating differ-
ent portions of space. Studies in monkeys provide
neurophysiological support for this dissociation. Ab-
lation of area 8 led to an attentional deficit within
contralesional space beyond reaching distance (far
space), whereas ablation of area 6 led to a specific
deficit within reaching distance (near space).5
Equally puzzling is the dissociation observed be-
tween some neglect patients’ treatment of physically
perceived vs mentally imagined (representational)
space. The behavior of two patients reported in the
1970s provided the first description of representa-
tional neglect.6 They were asked to imagine (“seeing”
in the absence of the corresponding sensory input) a
familiar city square from two opposite viewer-
centered reference frames. Both patients could de-
scribe only the right half of the square with respect
to their imagined viewpoint. Thus, despite knowing
the whole city square, they systematically omitted
the left half in a viewer-centered reference frame.
Rapidly different patients were discovered who
had a pure perceptual neglect,3 but also some rare
patients with a pure representational neglect.7 There
is an old question whether perception is organized
similarly to mental representation.8 If space is in-
deed fragmented in different compartments accord-
ing to the reaching-distance in perceptual domain,
we would expect to find the same near vs far distinc-
tion in purely representational space.9 We tested this
hypothesis in a patient with pure representational
neglect.
Patient and methods. This 78-year-old right-handed woman
had a hemorrhage of the right lateral temporo-occipital junction
(figure 1). Neurologic examination findings were normal, except
for a left-sided hyperreflexia. She was oriented and had no visual
field deficit. Detailed neuropsychological examination findings
were normal, except for a mild impaired figural fluency, discrete
difficulties with nonconventional views of objects, and minimal
difficulties in learning visuospatial (Rey signs) and verbal (Rey
words) information with intact recognition memory. Her short-
term memory was in the normal range for verbal (digit span) and
visuospatial modalities (Corsi block-tapping span). There was no
language impairment (Boston Naming Test, repetition, reading,
writing, and comprehension), apraxia, visual agnosia, or dysex-
ecutive disorder.
We tested perceptual and representational spaces in the fol-
lowing four, counterbalanced conditions.
Condition 1. We assessed near perceptual space with four
standard tasks using paper and pencil (line bisection and three
cancellation tasks using letters, digits, and lines). We also tested
her in a landscape-copying task, a star cancellation task, a clock-
copying task, sentence reading, and the “fluff test” (with eyes
closed).
Condition 2. We assessed far perceptual space with the same
four standard line bisection and cancellation tasks, as described
for near perceptual space, except that stimuli appeared at ~3.5 m
distance from the patient, who now used a laser pointer to
respond.
Condition 3. We assessed near representational space with
two tests investigating the space within her imagined reaching
distance. In the first test, the patient was asked to imagine herself
inside her car and to describe what she would see from two succes-
sively given viewpoints: from the passenger’s seat (i.e., the major-
ity of the dashboard on her left), and from the driver’s seat (i.e.,
the majority of the dashboard on her right). Her description was
recorded for 1 minute and was rated with reference to six main
items on each side of the given viewpoint, which are commonly
present in a car (figure 2A and 2B). In the second test (object
layout), she was instructed to carefully look at a number of objects
(three per side) placed within reach on the table in front of her.
She was then blindfolded and asked to recall, immediately and
after ~15 minutes’ delay, as many objects’ locations as possible
from two opposite imposed viewpoints.
Condition 4. We assessed far representational space with two
standard tests considered to probe beyond the reaching distance of
the hypothetical viewpoint of the patient. In the first (familiar
square description), the patient was asked to imagine the “Place
Neuve” (a familiar square in Geneva7) and to describe what she
would see from two opposite imposed viewpoints. In the second
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test (familiar map description), the patient was asked to imagine
the map of France as if she were a giant able to see very far and
name as many towns as possible from two opposite imposed view-
points (Paris and Marseille). This was done in order to reduce the
probability that she would behave as if she were holding a map in
her hands and rotating it.
Results. This two-by-two design modified either the nature of
the investigated space (perceptual or representational) or the
reaching distance (within or beyond). The patient showed a left
representational neglect only for far space in the absence of any
perceptual neglect. Indeed, she perceptually attended to all objects
presented, either to her right or left hemispace, both within (con-
dition 1) or beyond (condition 2) her reach. There was no signifi-
cant deviation in line bisection (near: mean deviation  1 mm 
3; far: mean deviation  3 mm  1) and no omission in the
cancellation tasks. Copying, reading tasks, and the “fluff test”
(with eyes closed) were not impaired by neglect-related errors.
Assessment of her near (within reaching distance) imagined
space (condition 3) did not reveal any neglect omission (table). In
contrast, when she mentally imagined a familiar scene/map (con-
dition 4), she only reported elements located to the right of her
hypothetical viewpoint, systematically omitting those on her left
side. In the familiar square description, she reported six buildings
on her right vs none on her left from both imagined viewpoints
(see figure 2C). In the familiar map description, she named six
cities on her left according to a hypothetical axis between Mar-
seille and Paris, against 12 on her right (McNemar 2  11.47,
p  0.0007). From the 180°-rotated imagined viewpoint, she listed
four cities to the left of her imaginary viewpoint vs 10 to the right
(McNemar 2  15.56, p  0.0001). This mental deficit was thus
restricted to the imagined descriptions supposed to be far away
from her reaching distance.
Discussion. These results provide clinical infor-
mation about the cerebral organization of imagined
(representational) space. This is of particular impor-
tance, because the mental representation of space is
difficult to assess in nonhuman primates.
Figure 1. (A–C) Coronal slices of T1-weighted MR images
(0.98 mm thick) and (D) three-dimensional brain recon-
struction, showing the patient’s hemorrhagic lesion involv-
ing the right lateral temporo-occipital junction.
Figure 2. Inside car test. These photographs indicate
what the patient might have imagined seeing (numbers
indicate locations of six main objects used for reference in
rating her performance) from (A) the passenger’s side (1 
rear-view mirror, 2  steering wheel, 3  gearbox, 4 
handbrake, 5  seat, 6  left door) or (B) driver’s side
(1  rear-view mirror; 2  glove compartment, 3  gear-
box, 4  handbrake, 5  seat, 6  right door). (C) Maps
of a familiar square in Geneva as described from mental
imagery. The position of each viewpoint is indicated by a
square with an arrow pointing in the imagined viewing
direction. Digits indicate locales reported by the patient
and are ordered according to the sequence in which they
were reported. Their shading corresponds to the imposed
viewpoint imagined by the patient at the time of test.
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Anatomically, both clinical studies as well as ex-
periments in healthy subjects suggest that the per-
ception of far space depends on temporal areas,2,10
whereas near perceptual space depends more on pa-
rietal areas.1,10 Brain damage in the few patients
with pure representational neglect does not suggest
one single location and was found after frontal, fron-
toparietal, or thalamic lesion in the right hemi-
sphere.7 Our patient showed severe viewer-centered
spatial neglect selective for far representational
space after a right lateral posterior temporal lesion.
Access to the mental representation of near “grasp-
ing” space thus remained intact. This can either be
due to a selective impairment of networks coding for
the representation of far space, or can alternatively
be due to the fact that far space is only visually
coded, whereas the representation of near space has
a visual and a motor memory component. Our data
suggest the following. First, whereas mental imagery
and sensory perception have distinct ways of access-
ing stored visual representations, they share some
conceptual mechanisms, at least along a far vs near
dimension. Second, temporal areas might be impor-
tant for the mental representation of far space when
a viewer-centered reference is imposed. Finally, our
findings call for an eventual discovery of a double-
dissociation, i.e., a patient with pure representa-
tional neglect only for near space, after rather a
right parietal than a temporal lesion.
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Table Performance on tasks testing near and far representational space for each of the two opposite imposed viewpoints
Far space Near space
The “Place Neuve” The map of France Object layout Inside of car
Left
hemispace
Right
hemispace
Left
hemispace
Right
hemispace
Left
hemispace
Right
hemispace
Left
hemispace
Right
hemispace
First
viewpoint
0% (0/6) 100% (6/6) 38% (6/16) 75% (12/16) 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3) 100% (6/6) —
Opposite
viewpoint
0% (0/6) 100% (6/6) 25% (4/16) 63% (10/16) 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3) — 100% (6/6)
The percentage (referenced to items reported in the nonneglected side) and number correct are shown.
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